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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Younger abstention is one of several abstention doctrines that the 
federal courts have used to refuse to hear cases that properly fall 
within their jurisdiction. Ever since the humble beginnings of the 
Younger abstention doctrine in 1971,1 the United States Supreme 
Court has engaged in a subtle and steady expansion of the scope of 
                                                                                                                      
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2004, Florida State University College of Law. I would like 
to thank Professor Steven Gey for his invaluable insight and expertise in the twisted realm 
of abstention and my incredible family for their enduring support.  
 1. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
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the doctrine. While the roots of the doctrine are found in the criminal 
law context, the Court has steadily moved towards the full applica-
tion of the doctrine in the civil law context. The Court assured us at 
each stage of expansion that it would not take the next steps in this 
progression toward full application of the doctrine across-the-board. 
Nevertheless, the Court has quietly and subtly transmogrified what 
was once a limited doctrine of abstention into an immense and im-
permeable legal construct predicated on dual sovereignty and en-
forced at the expense of federal law and the Constitution of the 
United States.  
 Initial parlays of the Younger abstention doctrine into the world of 
civil law were limited to the context of civil enforcement litigation. 
However, as Professor Stravitz predicted in the wake of Pennzoil Co. 
v. Texaco, Inc.,2 I intend to demonstrate in this Comment that the 
Younger abstention doctrine has reached full maturity in the civil 
law context. I will then discuss the unprecedented impacts of the 
consummated doctrine.  
 Part II of this Comment will briefly discuss the history of expan-
sions of the Younger abstention doctrine. Part III of this Comment 
will discuss the final frontier of Younger abstention and argue that 
the Supreme Court has functionally eliminated the limitations that 
purportedly restrain the doctrine. Part IV of this Comment will ex-
amine the impact of the expansion of Younger abstention to all civil 
cases, particularly the effective evisceration of federal court removal 
jurisdiction. Finally, Part V of this Comment will critique the legal 
and theoretical foundations of the expansions of Younger abstention 
that facilitated the increasing abdication of federal court removal ju-
risdiction.  
II.   A HISTORY OF DANGEROUS EXPANSIONS OF THE YOUNGER 
ABSTENTION DOCTRINE 
A.   A Doctrine Is Born: The Criminal Law Roots of  
Younger Abstention 
 In the beginning, there was Younger v. Harris.3 In Younger, a fed-
eral district court issued an injunction against an ongoing criminal 
prosecution in California because the prosecution was being con-
ducted under a patently unconstitutional statute.4 On appeal, the 
                                                                                                                      
 2. For a discussion of the historical expansions of the Younger abstention doctrine in 
the realm of civil law cases, see Howard B. Stravitz, Younger Abstention Reaches a Civil 
Maturity: Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 997 (1989). 
 3. 401 U.S. at 37. 
 4. In Younger, the federal plaintiff had been charged with violation of the California 
Criminal Syndicalism Act, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11400-11401 (West 1982). However, after 
indictment of the federal plaintiff in Younger, the Supreme Court struck down a virtually 
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Supreme Court reversed the injunction and engaged in a long discus-
sion of federalism that formed the basis for what is now known as the 
Younger abstention doctrine.5 In his discussion of Our Federalism, 
Justice Black argued that the related principles of comity and feder-
alism require the federal courts to recognize the independence of 
state institutions and not interfere with legitimate state functions, 
even for the purpose of enforcing federal rights.6 The holding of the 
case was seemingly limited to abstention on the part of federal courts 
in deference to pending state criminal prosecutions.7 However, the 
theoretical underpinnings of Our Federalism were seeded much 
deeper, and the case laid the groundwork for dramatic expansion in 
future cases.8  
                                                                                                                      
identical criminal syndicalism statute in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). In-
deed, the Court recounts these facts in the Younger opinion. 401 U.S. at 38-41. Neverthe-
less, the Court refused to interfere with the state court criminal prosecution that was pro-
ceeding under a clearly unconstitutional statute. 
 5. In discussing the related principles of comity and federalism, Justice Black coined 
the phrase Our Federalism: 
[The] reason for restraining courts of equity from interfering with criminal prose-
cutions is reinforced by an even more vital consideration, the notion of “comity,” 
that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the en-
tire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continu-
ance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and 
their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their sepa-
rate ways. This, perhaps for lack of a better and clearer way to describe it, is re-
ferred to by many as “Our Federalism,” and one familiar with the profound de-
bates that ushered our Federal Constitution into existence is bound to respect 
those who remain loyal to the ideals and dreams of “Our Federalism.” The con-
cept does not mean blind deference to “States’ Rights” any more than it means 
centralization of control over every important issue in our National Government 
and its courts. The Framers rejected both these courses. What the concept does 
represent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of 
both State and National Governments, and in which the National Government, 
anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal in-
terests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the 
legitimate activities of the States. It should never be forgotten that this slogan, 
“Our Federalism,” born in the early struggling days of our Union of States, occu-
pies a highly important place in our Nation’s history and its future.  
Younger, 401 U.S. at 44-45.  
 6. Id. 
 7. See id. at 46-53 (discussing the need for states to be able to prosecute their crimi-
nal statutes in good faith and without federal court interference as the justification for ab-
stention). 
 8. The decision in Younger was based on considerations of equity as well as the con-
cerns of comity and federalism. However, the Court’s use of the equitable justifications 
seemed like a mere segue from prior decisions into the far more expansive standards of 
Our Federalism. The Court stressed the overriding importance of this later justification by 
stating: 
This underlying reason for restraining courts of equity from interfering with 
criminal prosecutions is reinforced by an even more vital consideration, the notion 
of “comity,” that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact 
that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and 
a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the 
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 In addition to the discussion of Our Federalism, the Court also 
justified its holding in Younger on principles of equitable restraint.9 
Citing the Anti-Injunction Statute,10 the Court noted that there has 
been a longstanding policy against federal court interference with 
state court proceedings.11 In addition to interests of comity and fed-
eralism, the Court found that the principle of non-interference was 
justified by inherent limitations in the doctrine of equity.12 Under the 
doctrine of equity, courts in equity should not act to restrain another 
court if “the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will 
not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.”13 However, 
despite the Court’s discussion of restraint for courts sitting in equity, 
it was clear that the ruling was substantially predicated on federal-
ism grounds.14 Indeed, later cases would forsake the equity analysis 
because the abstention doctrine could only properly be expanded un-
der the Court’s federalism justifications.  
 While the scope of Younger abstention was seemingly limited to 
pending state criminal proceedings, the Court quickly dispelled any 
notion that the scope of the doctrine would remain that limited in 
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.15 The Huffman case was the product of an 
attempt by a local prosecutor to close a theater that played porno-
graphic films.16 Under Ohio’s public nuisance law, the prosecutor ob-
tained a judgment allowing him to close the theater and seize and 
                                                                                                                      
States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in 
their separate ways.  
Younger, 401 U.S. at 44 (emphasis added). 
 9. Id. at 43.  
 10. The Anti-Injunction Statute imposes an absolute ban on issuance of a federal in-
junction against a pending state court proceeding in absence of one of several recognized 
exceptions. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000). However, it is important to note that the Court’s deci-
sions in all its Younger abstention cases refuse to rely on the Anti-Injunction Statute and 
adopt the considerations of comity and federalism instead.  
 There are exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Statute that would allow a federal litigant to 
circumvent the statute in a number of cases where the Court wants abstention to apply. 
For example, a federal claim falls within an exception to the statute if it relies on a federal 
statute that creates a federal right or remedy enforceable in a federal court of equity. 
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238 (1972). The Mitchum Court found that 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 claims fall within the exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act. Id. at 242-43. Neverthe-
less, the Court has been more than willing to apply Younger abstention in cases that are 
brought under § 1983. Consequently, the Court’s abstention analysis has never been overly 
concerned with the operation of the Anti-Injunction Statute. 
 11. Justice Black stated, “the normal thing to do when federal courts are asked to en-
join pending proceedings in state courts is not to issue such injunctions.” Younger, 401 U.S. 
at 45.  
 12. Id. at 43. 
 13. Id. at 43-44. 
 14. For a brief discussion of the Court’s repudiation of the equitable foundations of 
the doctrine in favor of the concerns of comity and federalism, see Larry W. Yackle, Ex-
plaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991, 1042 (1985). 
 15. 420 U.S. 592 (1975). 
 16. Id. at 595. 
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sell the theater’s property.17 In response, the theater owner filed a 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 claim to enjoin enforcement of the state court judg-
ment.18 After the district court granted the injunction, the Supreme 
Court used Younger abstention to reverse the district court on ap-
peal.19  
 While Huffman involved a civil enforcement case, the Court deftly 
stated that the state civil proceeding was both “in aid of and closely 
related to criminal statutes which prohibit the dissemination of ob-
scene materials.”20 By virtue of this relationship to state criminal 
proceedings, the Court used the Younger abstention principles to 
foreclose the district court from hearing a § 1983 claim for an injunc-
tion of the state court judgment.21 As a product of the first Rehnquist 
opinion applying Younger, Huffman is the cornerstone for several 
important developments in the expansion of the Younger abstention 
doctrine. First, Huffman represented the first extension of the doc-
trine into the civil law context. Because Younger had relied to some 
degree on the discussion of restraint in equity, it was not at all clear 
that the Younger doctrine could be properly applied outside criminal 
law cases. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist himself stated in Huffman that 
“[s]trictly speaking, [the equity doctrine] is not available to mandate 
federal restraint in civil cases.”22 Nevertheless, the Court was deter-
mined to expand the doctrine, and it did so by casting aside the eq-
uity justifications and relying solely on the principles of comity and 
federalism.23 Furthermore, Huffman introduced the “state interest” 
analysis that became the new limiting factor in defining the bounda-
ries of the doctrine.24  
                                                                                                                      
 17. Id. at 598. 
 18. Id. at 598-99. 
 19. Id. at 592. 
 20. Id. at 604. 
 21. Id. at 592. 
 22. Id. at 604. In deciding Huffman, Rehnquist specifically pressed the federalism ra-
tionale of Younger because that rationale is equally applicable to both criminal and civil 
proceedings. Rehnquist avoided the equity rationale of Younger, because “[s]trictly speak-
ing, this element of Younger is not available to mandate federal restraint in civil cases.” Id. 
Because the federalism rationale is the only one that truly applies to civil cases, Rehnquist 
emphasized that rationale so that the doctrine could be expanded beyond the criminal law 
context. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. In analyzing the issue of federal judicial restraint, Justice Rehnquist pointed 
to an opinion by Justice Holmes that counseled federal courts to restrain from issuing in-
junctions against officers of the state. Id. at 603 (citing Mass. State Grange v. Benton, 272 
U.S. 525 (1926)). While the Holmes opinion discussed a “bill seeking an injunction against 
state executive officers, rather than against state judicial proceedings,” Rehnquist argued 
that the relevant considerations of federalism counsel more heavily toward federal re-
straint in the context of judicial proceedings since:  
[I]nterference with a state judicial proceeding prevents the state not only from ef-
fectuating its substantive policies, but also from continuing to perform the sepa-
rate function of providing a forum competent to vindicate any constitutional ob-
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 While the court cast aside the equity justifications for the Younger 
abstention doctrine, the fact remained that Younger was primarily 
being applied in cases that sought equitable relief from the federal 
court. It was not until much later that the Court would consider the 
full application of Younger to actions at law. However, even before 
the decision in Huffman, the Court expanded the scope of Younger 
abstention beyond cases that merely sought injunctive relief. In 
Samuels v. Mackell,25 the Court extended the Younger decision to 
cases seeking declaratory relief as well as those seeking injunctive 
relief.26 The Samuels Court held that the basic policy against federal 
interference with a state court criminal prosecution would be frus-
trated as much by a declaratory judgment as it would by an injunc-
tion.27 The scope of the Younger abstention doctrine remained limited 
to cases seeking declaratory or injunctive relief until the Court’s wa-
tershed opinion in Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n v. McNary.28 
B.   The Younger Exceptions: Do They Really Exist? 
 Implicit in the Younger opinion is the fact that a federal court may 
act to enjoin a state court proceeding when certain extraordinary cir-
cumstances exist that call for equitable relief.29 These exceptions are 
predicated on traditional considerations of equity jurisprudence.30 
While the Court has definitively abandoned the equitable justifica-
tions for Younger, the exceptions to the doctrine that arise in equity 
arguably survived. However, it has been widely observed that the 
Court has effectively narrowed these exceptions to the point of mak-
                                                                                                                      
jections interposed against those policies. Such interference also results in dupli-
cative legal proceedings, and can readily be interpreted as reflecting negatively 
upon the state court’s ability to enforce constitutional principles. 
Id. at 604 (internal citations omitted). This language represents the effective birth of the 
state interest analysis. 
 25. 401 U.S. 66 (1971). Samuels involved a challenge to a New York criminal anarchy 
statute which made advocating the overthrow of the government by violence or any unlaw-
ful means a felony punishable by up to 10 years imprisonment and/or a $5,000 fine. The 
state court defendants were charged with voluntarily organizing a group for the purpose of 
advocating the violent overthrow of the State of New York. Samuels v. Mackell, 288 F. 
Supp. 348, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff’d, 401 U.S. 66 (1971). 
 26. 401 U.S. at 73. 
 27. Id. 
 28. 454 U.S. 100 (1981). Fair Assessment represented the first case in which the court 
expanded the doctrine of abstention to an action for damages. As of 1981, Younger absten-
tion was no longer limited to claims seeking merely injunctive or declaratory relief. 
 29. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53-54 (1971). For a good discussion of the equita-
ble exceptions to Younger and their limited practical role, see Brian Stagner, Avoiding Ab-
stention: The Younger Exceptions, 29 TEX. TECH L. REV. 137 (1998). 
 30. All three of the equitable exceptions are taken from language in the Younger opin-
ion that is derived from its discussion of equitable justifications for restraint. See generally 
Younger, 401 U.S. at 37. 
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ing them virtually non-existent.31 Several commentators have writ-
ten extensively about these exceptions.32 Therefore, I will only engage 
in a limited review of the important considerations. 
 There are three principal exceptions to the Younger abstention 
doctrine. The first is the bad faith and harassment exception. In 
Younger v. Harris, the Court “specifically mentioned bad faith and 
harassment as the kind of extraordinary circumstances that would 
justify federal intervention” into the state proceeding.33 The Court 
stated that injunctive relief would be available if the state prosecu-
tion was brought in bad faith and to harass the criminal defendant.34 
The Court has generally defined bad faith and harassment as a 
prosecution that has been brought without a reasonable expectation 
of obtaining a valid conviction.35 In line with the Court’s opinion in 
Dombrowski v. Pfister,36 a litigant seeking to invoke this exception 
must show a “combination of impermissible motive, multiple prose-
cutions, and improbability of success.”37 Hence, this is a virtually im-
possible standard to satisfy. Since the Younger decision, the Court 
has never invoked the exception to find state action constituting a 
bad faith prosecution.38 In fact, the Court has specifically declined to 
use the exception on several different occasions.39 Moreover, litigants 
that have tried to invoke the exception in lower courts have had little 
                                                                                                                      
 31.  William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 498 (1977) (concluding that the showings under the various 
exceptions are “probably impossible to make”); James C. Rehnquist, Taking Comity Seri-
ously: How to Neutralize the Abstention Doctrine, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1084 n.197 (1994) 
(describing the exceptions as “relatively unimportant” and “inconsistent with a properly 
conceived abstention doctrine”); Stagner, supra note 29, at 141 (describing the Younger ex-
ceptions as an “escape hatch that rarely opens”); C. Keith Wingate, The Bad Faith-
Harassment Exception to the Younger Doctrine: Exploring the Empty Universe, 5 REV. 
LITIG. 123, 124 (1986) (stating that recognition of the bad-faith exception “has been limited 
to a virtually empty universe”).  
 32. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 31. 
 33. Stagner, supra note 29, at 141.   
 34. Younger, 401 U.S. at 48-50. 
 35. Id. at 48. 
 36. 380 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 37. Stagner, supra note 29, at 157. See Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 479. While ruling on 
other grounds, the Dombrowski Court believed that a valid claim of bad faith was evident 
under the facts because threats to enforce the statute against the defendants were “not 
made with any expectation of securing valid convictions, but [as] part of a plan to employ 
arrests, seizures, and threats of prosecution” to harass the defendants and deprive them of 
constitutionally protected rights. Id. at 482. 
 38. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 13.4, at 751 (2d ed. 1994). 
 39. See, e.g., Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 338 (1977) (refusing to find bad faith and 
further restricting its scope by stating, “[the bad faith] exception may not be utilized unless 
it is alleged and proved that [the judges] are enforcing the contempt procedures in bad 
faith or are motivated by a desire to harass”); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 350-51 
(1975) (refusing to acknowledge bad faith because the plaintiffs failed to show that faulty 
warrants were either knowingly relied on by prosecutors or knowingly issued by judges). 
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success.40 Consequently, many commentators have essentially argued 
that the exception does not really exist at all.41  
 The second Younger exception is the patently unconstitutional ex-
ception.42 Indeed, Justice Black stated, “[t]here may, of course, be ex-
traordinary circumstances in which the necessary irreparable injury 
can be shown even in the absence of the usual prerequisites of bad 
faith and harassment.”43 To illustrate his point, Justice Black stated 
that, “[i]t is of course conceivable that a statute might be flagrantly 
and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every 
clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and 
against whomever an effort might be made to apply it.”44 However, 
history showed that it is virtually impossible to imagine a statute 
that could satisfy an exception as prohibitive and narrowly construed 
as this one. There is not a single instance in which the Court has in-
voked the patently unconstitutional exception to justify federal inter-
vention.45 In fact, in Trainor v. Hernandez, the Court found the appli-
cable statute to be patently unconstitutional.46 However, the Court 
again refused to apply the exception because the statute was not lit-
erally unconstitutional “in every clause, sentence and paragraph.”47 
As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, the patently unconstitutional 
exception would be “unavailable whenever a statute has a legitimate 
title, or a legitimate severability clause, or some other equally in-
nocuous provision.”48 Accordingly, the Court’s interpretation of the 
exception has utterly eviscerated it of meaning and rendered it a 
mere showpiece.49 
 The third and final Younger exception is one predicated on the 
lack of an adequate state forum.50 Unlike the prior two exceptions, 
the Court has actually used this final exception in practice.51 In Gib-
son v. Berryhill,52 the Court stated that federal intervention is appro-
priate under this exception if the state courts are biased and unable 
to be trusted on a particular issue.53 In Gibson, the Court found that 
                                                                                                                      
 40. Stagner, supra note 29, at 148. 
 41. Id. at 157; Brennan, supra note 31, at 498; Owen M. Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE 
L.J. 1103, 1115 (1977). 
 42. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53-54 (1971). 
 43. Id. at 53. 
 44. Id. at 53-54 (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941)). 
 45. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 38, § 13.4, at 753. 
 46. 431 U.S. 434 (1977). 
 47. Id. at 447 (quoting Watson, 313 U.S. at 402). 
 48. Id. at 463 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 49. Id. (concluding that the majority eliminated the patently unconstitutional excep-
tion). 
 50. Stagner, supra note 29, at 163. 
 51. Id. at 164-65. 
 52. 411 U.S. 564 (1973). 
 53. Id. at 578-80. 
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a board of optometrists was incapable of fairly adjudicating the dis-
pute before it because every member had a financial stake in the out-
come.54 However, the Court has been far more restrictive in its rul-
ings in other cases,55 especially cases that involve the state judici-
ary.56 Indeed, even when bias can be shown, the litigant must also 
demonstrate that as a function of systematic bias, recusal provisions 
are either unavailable or ineffective.57 In sum, the opportunities to 
invoke an equitable exception to Younger abstention are rare. 
C.   The Expansion: Removing Limitations One at a Time 
 A mere month after the decision in Huffman, the Court went back 
to work on removing the doctrine’s restrictions. In Hicks v. 
Miranda,58 the Court decided to apply Younger to a criminal proceed-
ing that was not pending at the time the federal action was filed.59 
The Court determined that abstention is appropriate even when a 
state proceeding is not pending at the time the federal suit is initi-
ated, as long as a proceeding is initiated in state court prior to any 
hearings of substance on the merits in federal court.60 Writing for the 
majority, Justice White stated that no case under Younger had re-
quired that a state criminal proceeding be pending on the day that 
the federal action is filed.61 The effect of this ruling is to create a re-
verse removal power for the state to defeat the plaintiff’s choice of the 
                                                                                                                      
 54. Id. at 579. 
 55. See, e.g., Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 
423, 435-37 (1982) (finding that the state bar was not an inadequate forum for raising first 
amendment objections to state bar disciplinary rules because the record did not indicate 
that the bar committee would have refused to hear a first amendment challenge to its dis-
ciplinary rules). 
 56. See Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 125-29 (1975) (arguing that the availability of 
recusal provisions in New Jersey courts substantially undermines any claim of bias sur-
rounding the judiciary). 
 57. See Brooks v. N.H. Supreme Court, 80 F.3d 633, 640 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating that 
the “biased” exception to the Younger abstention doctrine is inapposite if an aggrieved 
party fails to employ available procedures for the recusal of biased judges). 
 58. 422 U.S. 332 (1975). Vincent Miranda owned an adult theater. His employees had 
been indicted on criminal obscenity charges in California state court. Miranda, who had 
not been named in the action, filed suit in federal court on November 29, 1973. In the fed-
eral claim, he alleged that the obscenity statute was unconstitutional, and he asked for in-
junctive relief for return of the films that were declared obscene in state court. On January 
15, 1974, a mere day after the completion of service on the federal complaint, the state 
prosecutors amended the state claim to include Miranda as a defendant. Id. at 335-40. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 349. 
 61. Id. Actually, the Younger Court refused to address the purported requirement of 
an ongoing state proceeding, specifically reserving the question for later: “We express no 
view about the circumstances under which federal courts may act when there is no prose-
cution pending in state courts at the time the federal proceeding is begun.” Younger v. 
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971). 
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federal forum.62 Accordingly, the abstention doctrine does not apply 
when a federal claim is initiated first and proceeds to the merits 
without an intervening state proceeding. The practical effect of this 
is to give the federal plaintiff an incentive to “race to the courthouse” 
as a means of circumventing the harsh rule in Younger.63 To put it 
another way, a person may only avail himself of his right to a federal 
forum if his attorney is smart enough and athletic enough to beat the 
state in a footrace to the district court. However, as Justice Stewart 
articulated in his dissent, the race is carefully set up so that the state 
will always win.64 
 While the dangers inherent in the Huffman and Miranda rulings 
were seemingly limited by the narrow application of Younger to civil 
cases that are “in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes,”65 it 
was obvious even to the dissenters in Huffman that the dangerous 
precedent set on that day would soon expand well beyond the scope of 
the facts of that case.66 Indeed, in Juidice v. Vail,67 the Court un-
equivocally stated that the scope of the Younger abstention doctrine 
was not limited to criminal or quasi-criminal cases.68 The early rul-
ings under the Younger abstention doctrine were limited to the 
criminal law because the state’s interest in executing cases in state 
court free from federal interference is the strongest in the criminal 
law context.69 However, the Court in Juidice stated that Younger ab-
stention applies anytime that a federal court is asked to interfere 
with a pending state proceeding that implicates a state interest, re-
                                                                                                                      
 62. See Bryce M. Baird, Comment, Federal Court Abstention in Civil Rights Cases: 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and the New Doctrine of Civil Rights Abstention, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 
501, 531 (1994) (arguing that the effect of the Hicks ruling was to create a “reverse re-
moval” power that would allow the state to defeat the plaintiff’s choice of a federal forum 
by simply initiating an action in state court that would be owed deference before the fed-
eral court initiated proceedings on the merits). 
 63. In Hicks, Justice Stewart discussed the practical operation of the Younger doc-
trine in his dissent: 
 There is, to be sure, something unseemly about having the applicability of the 
Younger doctrine turn solely on the outcome of a race to the courthouse. The rule 
the Court adopts today, however, does not eliminate that race; it merely permits 
the State to leave the mark later, run a shorter course, and arrive first at the fin-
ish line. 
Hicks, 422 U.S. at 354 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 64. See id. 
 65. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975).  
 66. Id. at 613 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I dissent. The treatment of the state civil 
proceeding as one ‘in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes’ is obviously only the 
first step toward extending to state civil proceedings generally the holding of Younger v. 
Harris . . . .”). Id. (quoting the majority opinion). 
 67. 430 U.S. 327 (1977). 
 68. Id. at 334. 
 69. See id. at 335 (finding that the state’s interest in its contempt procedures was suf-
ficient to warrant abstention despite the fact that “it is not quite as important as is the 
State’s interest in the enforcement of its criminal laws . . . or even its interest in the main-
tenance of a quasi-criminal proceeding”). 
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gardless of whether the case is criminal or civil.70 Juidice was a civil 
case for debt collection between two private parties.71 While the liti-
gation was still pending in state court, one of the parties filed a § 
1983 claim in federal court challenging the constitutionality of the 
state court’s contempt procedures.72 Even though the case was purely 
a civil case, the Court found that the state has a clear interest in the 
execution of its contempt procedures and that the district court 
should have abstained by virtue of its impact on the state court pro-
ceeding.73 Accordingly, the Court expanded the scope of the doctrine 
by signaling its willingness to find an important state interest in civil 
law cases. In fact, the court found an important state interest in 
Juidice even though the state was not a party to the litigation.74 
 Of course, prosecution of any state civil law that serves some state 
interest implicates an important state interest. Therefore, virtually 
any civil case in which the state is seeking to enforce a civil law or 
ordinance falls within the scope of the Younger abstention doctrine. 
Accordingly, a party seeking to use 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to vindicate a 
federal right that is threatened in a state proceeding would be unable 
to do so by virtue of Younger abstention.75 It is this very development 
that Justice Brennan foresaw in the Huffman dissent76 and repudi-
ated with disgust in the Juidice dissent.77 Furthermore, the impacts 
                                                                                                                      
 70. See id. at 335-36 (finding that the state’s interest in its contempt procedures war-
ranted abstention regardless of whether the process leading to the finding of contempt of 
court is labeled civil, quasi-criminal, or criminal). 
 71. Id. at 329-30. 
 72. Id. at 330. 
 73. Id. at 335-36. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See Baird, supra note 62. It should be noted that the sweeping effect that Younger 
abstention has on § 1983 claims represents a judicial abdication of federal jurisdiction 
every bit as disturbing and irresponsible as the one discussed in this Comment. Indeed, the 
effect of Younger abstention on civil rights litigation has been so sweeping that Mr. Baird 
renamed the entire area of abstention cases as “Civil Rights Abstention.” Id. Since scholar-
ship has already been devoted to the issue, I will not take the time to review the effects of 
Younger abstention on § 1983. However, claims brought under § 1983 properly invoke the 
congressionally mandated jurisdiction of the federal courts. Consequently, any reader 
wishing to appreciate the full scope of the judiciary’s abdication of its federal jurisdiction 
should also review the effects of abstention in the context of § 1983. 
 76. In Huffman, Justice Brennan argued in a vigorous dissent that extending Younger 
to § 1983 claims would directly contravene with the congressional purpose of that statute: 
 Even if the extension of Younger v. Harris to pending state civil proceedings 
can be appropriate in any case, and I do not think it can be, it is plainly improper 
in the case of an action by a federal plaintiff, as in this case, grounded upon 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. That statute serves a particular congressional objective long rec-
ognized and enforced by the Court. Today’s extension will defeat that objective.  
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 616 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 77. With the continued erosion of access to federal courts in § 1983 cases, Justice 
Brennan blasted the Court’s application of abstention principles to § 1983 claims: 
 In requiring the District Court to eject the federal plaintiff from the federal 
courthouse and to force him to seek vindication of his federal rights in pending 
state proceedings, the Court effectively cripples the congressional scheme enacted 
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of Juidice are even more sweeping than the apparent prohibition of 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for injunctive relief against a state actor. In-
deed, the Court applied Younger in Juidice even though the litigation 
was solely between two private litigants. Therefore, the Juidice case 
opened the scope of the Younger abstention doctrine to virtually any 
civil case that requests injunctive relief that would impact a state in-
terest, even if the state was not a party to the litigation.78 In fact, the 
Supreme Court relied almost exclusively on Juidice in cementing the 
role of Younger in wholly private litigation in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, 
Inc.79  
 While the Juidice case implicitly recognized that the scope of the 
Younger abstention doctrine was in fact immense, many of the ex-
pansions implicit in the ruling were not explicitly recognized until 
later. Two months after Juidice, the Court affirmed its civil applica-
tion of Younger in Trainor v. Hernandez.80 In Trainor, an Illinois 
state agency sought the return of public assistance funds alleged to 
have been fraudulently obtained by the defendant.81 The agency also 
instituted an attachment proceeding to freeze the defendant’s credit 
union account.82 Rather than responding to the underlying state liti-
gation, the defendant filed a § 1983 claim in federal district court, al-
leging that the Illinois attachment statute deprived the debtors of 
their property without due process of law.83 Admittedly, this case was 
in the civil enforcement context where the state was a party, but it 
did not involve an attack on the underlying state proceeding. In-
stead, it merely raised a collateral challenge to the constitutionality 
of the attachment statute.84 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court saw fit 
                                                                                                                      
in § 1983. The crystal clarity of the congressional decision and purpose in adopt-
ing § 1983, and the unbroken line of this Court’s cases enforcing that decision, 
expose Huffman and today’s decision as deliberate and conscious floutings of a 
decision Congress was constitutionally empowered to make. It stands the § 1983 
remedy on its head to deny the § 1983 plaintiff access to the federal forum be-
cause of the pendency of state civil proceedings where Congress intended that the 
district court should entertain his suit without regard to the pendency of the 
state suit. Rather than furthering principles of comity and our federalism, forced 
federal abdication in this context undercuts one of the chief values of federal-
ism—the protection and vindication of important and overriding federal civil 
rights, which Congress, in § 1983 and the Judiciary Act of 1875, ordained should 
be a primary responsibility of the federal courts. 
Juidice, 430 U.S. at 343-44 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 78. See Stravitz, supra note 2, at 1010-11 (arguing that the Supreme Court agreed 
with abstention because of the state’s interest in its contempt procedures despite the fact 
that the litigation was between two purely private parties). 
 79. See 481 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1987). 
 80. 431 U.S. 434 (1977). 
 81. Id. at 435-36. 
 82. Id. at 436-37. 
 83. Id. at 438. 
 84. Id. 
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to refuse the case on Younger abstention grounds.85 Again, the Court 
signaled its willingness to extend the Younger abstention doctrine to 
any state proceeding that implicated an important state interest. 
More importantly, the Court signaled that Younger abstention can be 
applied even when the claim for an injunction in the federal court 
does not directly impact the underlying state proceeding. This was 
yet another important predicate for the Court’s ruling in Pennzoil Co. 
v. Texaco, Inc.86  
 The next notable extension of the Younger abstention doctrine 
came in Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar 
Ass’n.87 In this case, the New Jersey bar brought a state bar discipli-
nary proceeding against one of its members.88 In response, the attor-
ney filed an action in federal court claiming that the state discipli-
nary rules violated the First Amendment.89 At the time, the rules for 
disciplining attorneys did not specifically provide for constitutional 
challenges to the disciplinary process.90 Consequently, the attorney 
felt that he must address his claim in federal court. However, New 
Jersey’s interest in licensing and disciplining its attorneys is clearly 
sufficient to trigger the state interest requirement for Younger ab-
stention.91 The only pertinent issue was whether the administrative 
body of the state bar provided sufficient opportunity to raise federal 
constitutional objections. Continuing the presumption in favor of 
finding an adequate opportunity first articulated in Moore v. Sims,92 
the Court held that there was no reason to believe that the local 
committee of the state bar would refuse to hear a First Amendment 
challenge to the disciplinary rules.93 Therefore, the Court made it 
                                                                                                                      
 85. Id. at 447. 
 86. See Pennzoil v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1987) (relying on Trainor v. Her-
nandez to determine that federal court challenges to various state procedures merit ab-
stention so long as they “relate” to an actual state proceeding). 
 87. 457 U.S. 423 (1982). 
 88. Id. at 427-28.  
 89. Id. at 429. 
 90. Id. at 430 n.8. 
 91. Id. at 434. In finding that attorney licensing and disciplining procedures are of 
paramount state interest, the Court stated: 
 The State of New Jersey has an extremely important interest in maintaining 
and assuring the professional conduct of the attorneys it licenses. States tradi-
tionally have exercised extensive control over the professional conduct of attor-
neys. . . . The judiciary as well as the public is dependent upon professionally 
ethical conduct of attorneys and thus has a significant interest in assuring and 
maintaining high standards of conduct of attorneys engaged in practice. The 
State’s interest in the professional conduct of attorneys involved in the admini-
stration of criminal justice is of special importance. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 92. 442 U.S. 415, 425-26 (1979). 
 93. The Court found that there was an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional 
challenges in the state committee by stating:  
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clear that a federal district court must abstain under Younger even if 
the only pending state proceeding is an administrative proceeding.94 
This initial parlay into the realm of abstention for administrative 
proceedings was cemented by the Court in Ohio Civil Rights Com-
mission v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc.95 The Court also made it 
clear that one of the exceptions to Younger, predicated on the lack of 
sufficient opportunity to bring federal claims in the state proceeding, 
is more illusory than real.96 Again, this is a dangerous expansion of 
the scope of this doctrine. 
 Together, these cases form the doctrinal predicate for the final 
frontier of Younger abstention. While the doctrine began as an inno-
cent directive to abstain from requests to enjoin pending state crimi-
nal prosecutions, it was subtly transformed into a vastly prohibitive 
doctrine of abstention that applies to criminal, quasi-criminal, and 
civil enforcement cases. Yet, the expansion of this doctrine did not 
end there. Indeed, the final frontier of the Younger abstention doc-
trine lies in its application to virtually all pending state litigation. 
III.   THE FINAL FRONTIER OF YOUNGER ABSTENTION 
A.   The Pennzoil Litigation: An Abdication of the Important State 
Interest Limitation 
 The final frontier of Younger abstention begins with the Court’s 
infamous decision in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.97 In this case, com-
peting tender offers for the Getty Oil Company prompted Pennzoil to 
sue Texaco for tortious interference in a Texas state court.98 As a re-
sult of the lawsuit, Pennzoil was awarded a judgment for over $11 
billion.99 However, Texas law permitted Pennzoil to execute the 
                                                                                                                      
[The federal plaintiff] contends that there was no opportunity in the state disci-
plinary proceedings to raise his federal constitutional challenge to the discipli-
nary rules. Yet [he] failed to respond to the complaint filed by the local Ethics 
Committee and failed even to attempt to raise any federal constitutional chal-
lenge in the state proceedings. Under New Jersey’s procedure, its Ethics Commit-
tees constantly are called upon to interpret the state disciplinary rules. [Plaintiff] 
points to nothing existing at the time the complaint was brought by the local 
Committee to indicate that the members of the Ethics Committee, the majority of 
whom are lawyers, would have refused to consider a claim that the rules which 
they were enforcing violated federal constitutional guarantees. 
Middlesex County, 457 U.S. at 435. 
 94. See Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619 (1986); 
Middlesex County, 457 U.S. at 434, 435; Cf. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. City of New 
Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (1989) (holding that Younger only applies to administrative proceed-
ings that are “judicial” in nature). 
 95. 477 U.S. at 619. 
 96. See generally Stagner, supra note 29. 
 97. 481 U.S. 1 (1987). 
 98. Id. at 4. 
 99. Id. 
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judgment pending appeal unless Texaco filed a supersedeas bond in 
the amount of the judgment.100 Texaco could not post the required 
bond, so it filed a § 1983 action in federal court challenging the con-
stitutionality of the Texas bond requirement on due process 
grounds.101 This case, like Juidice v. Vail,102 involved a lawsuit be-
tween two private parties. Furthermore, like Trainor v. Hernandez,103 
the federal claim did not challenge the underlying state claim. In-
stead, Texaco’s § 1983 claim merely raised a challenge to the Texas 
bond requirement because it effectively functioned as an absolute bar 
of its right to appeal.104 However, despite the Court’s reliance on 
Juidice, the Texaco claim did not quite fall within the prior Younger 
case law. In Juidice, the Court found a substantial state interest be-
cause the claim challenged the state court’s contempt procedures.105 
If the federal court had intervened, the ruling would have affected 
the ability of all the state courts to enforce their judgments through 
contempt procedures.106 However, the Texaco claim challenged a bond 
requirement in Texas that operated merely as a procedural insur-
ance mechanism for the litigant that prevailed at the trial court 
level.107 As Justice Brennan stated in his concurring opinion, “the in-
terest in enforcing the bond and lien requirement is privately held by 
Pennzoil, not by the State of Texas.”108 Indeed, the State of Texas 
filed an amicus curiae brief to inform the Court that the state had no 
interest in the outcome of the case.109 Moreover, the state’s interest in 
the bond requirement is seemingly no different than its interest in 
the rules of court, evidence, or any other procedural matter. Never-
                                                                                                                      
 100. Id. at 4-5. 
 101. Id. at 7. 
 102. 430 U.S. 327 (1977). 
 103. 431 U.S. 434 (1977). 
 104. Discussing the effect that the bond requirement might have on Texaco, the Court 
observed: 
 Even before the trial court entered judgment, the jury’s verdict cast a serious 
cloud on Texaco’s financial situation. The amount of the bond required by Rule 
364(b) would have been more than $13 billion. It is clear that Texaco would not 
have been able to post such a bond. Accordingly, the business and financial com-
munity concluded that Pennzoil would be able, under the lien and bond provi-
sions of Texas law, to commence enforcement of any judgment entered on the 
verdict before Texaco’s appeals had been resolved. 
Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 5 (citations and quotations omitted). 
 105. 430 U.S. at 335. 
 106. Id. at 335-36. 
 107. See infra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 108. Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 20 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 109. The State of Texas represented to the court of appeals that it “has no interest in 
the outcome of the state-court adjudication underlying this cause,” except in its fair adjudi-
cation. Brief for Intervenor-Appellant at 2, Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 784 F.2d 1133, 
1150 (2d Cir. 1986) (Nos. 86-7046, 86-7052). 
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theless, the Court found that the bond requirement involved a state 
interest sufficient to trigger Younger abstention.110 
 Pennzoil was not an accident. The Court unanimously concluded 
that Texaco was not entitled to relief.111 However, the opinion split 
five ways in six different opinions, and five votes held that Younger 
abstention applied.112 The Pennzoil litigation was a high profile case 
with enormous financial stakes. Despite Justice Marshall’s warning 
that big money cases are stigmatized from the outset as bad law,113 
the Pennzoil case is one of tremendous doctrinal significance. First, if 
the Court wanted to avoid Younger, there was plenty of opportunity 
for the majority to join in one of the opinions that was issued on 
other grounds.114 Instead, the Court took Younger abstention head on 
and used it as a staging point for yet another tremendous expansion 
of the doctrine. 
 All previous applications of Younger were predicated on the issue 
of federalism and the need to avoid friction between the state and 
federal court systems. However, the state interest requirement was 
virtually eliminated by this ruling.115 The Texaco claim did not im-
pact the state proceeding or remove it from the state court system. 
Instead, it merely challenged a post-judgment bond requirement that 
would have prevented Texaco from appealing its case in state 
court.116 As Justice Stevens astutely observed in his concurring opin-
ion, the Court in its previous civil applications of Younger has “in-
variably required that the State have a substantive interest in the 
ongoing proceeding, an interest that goes beyond its interest as adju-
dicator of wholly private disputes.”117 However, Justice Stevens quite 
accurately noted that the majority’s opinion in Pennzoil abdicates 
this critical limitation and “cuts the Younger doctrine adrift” from its 
inherent doctrinal moorings.118 The state’s interest amounted to noth-
ing more than the interest of state courts in remaining free from fed-
eral judicial intrusion.119 Consequently, the ruling in Pennzoil opened 
the doors of Younger abstention to purely civil cases between purely 
                                                                                                                      
 110. Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 11. 
 111. Id. at 2-3. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 26 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 114. All nine justices concluded that Texaco was not entitled to relief. If the majority 
did not want to render an opinion under Younger, those justices could have signed onto one 
of the concurring opinions that was issued on separate grounds. This fact should not be 
overlooked in examining the doctrinal significance of this case. 
 115. For a good discussion of the impact of Pennzoil on the state interest test, see Ann 
Althouse, The Misguided Search for State Interest in Abstention Cases: Observations on the 
Occasion of Pennzoil v. Texaco, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1051 (1988). 
 116. See supra text accompanying note 104. 
 117. Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 30 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 20-21 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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private litigants, regardless of whether there is a discernible state in-
terest involved. The only limitation on the doctrine that remains is 
the purported refusal to apply Younger to civil cases for damages. 
However, even this limitation is a facade. 
B.   Civil Claims for Damages: Does Younger Abstention Go This Far? 
 From the beginning, Younger abstention had its roots in the realm 
of equity.120 In its early cases, the Supreme Court used the general 
reluctance of our courts to use their equitable powers as a means of 
justifying abstention from demands for injunctive relief against state 
court proceedings. Even as the Court rejected the reliance on equita-
ble principles and pushed the concept of Our Federalism,121 the appli-
cation of Younger abstention was limited to cases that requested eq-
uitable relief.122 Admittedly, the Court also applied Younger absten-
tion to cases that asked for declaratory relief.123 However, the Court 
was reluctant to fully extend the doctrine of abstention to civil cases 
for damages.124 Nevertheless, the abstention doctrine was eventually 
applied to civil claims for damages as well. 
1. Applying Abstention to Civil Claims for Damages: The Genesis 
of the Stay Versus Dismissal Distinction 
 In Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n v. McNary,125 the Court 
took its first steps into the final frontier of Younger abstention. Fair 
Assessment represented the first case in which the Court applied ab-
stention to cases contemplating damages as opposed to simply de-
claratory or injunctive relief. The plaintiffs brought a § 1983 chal-
lenge to the local government’s system of property tax evaluations.126 
The claim raised purported violations of the equal protection and due 
process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.127 Justice Rehnquist 
opined that the § 1983 claim would have interfered with the state 
function of collecting taxes, and therefore, the district court should 
                                                                                                                      
 120. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971). In Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
the Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit in stating that “it has long been established that a 
federal court has the authority to decline to exercise its jurisdiction when it ‘is asked to 
employ its historic powers as a court of equity.’” 517 U.S. 706, 717 (1996) (quoting Fair As-
sessment in Real Estate Ass’n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring)). 
 121. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975). 
 122. While the Court applied Younger to declaratory actions, Samuels v. Mackell, 401 
U.S. 66 (1971), that were technically actions at law, the Court did not apply Younger to any 
other kind of case at law until its watershed opinion in Fair Assessment, 454 U.S. at 100. 
 123. Samuels, 401 U.S. at 66. 
 124. Cf. Fair Assessment, 454 U.S. at 100 (applying abstention to a civil claim for dam-
ages, but only because the award of damages would have had an effect similar to an in-
junction). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 106. 
 127. Id. 
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have abstained from hearing the case.128 While the claim sought only 
monetary relief, the Court found that a favorable ruling would have 
impacted the operation of the tax scheme in much the same way as 
an injunction.129 Consequently, the Court made it clear that even 
mere claims for damages are not immune from abstention.  
 In Deakins v. Monaghan,130 targets of a state grand jury investiga-
tion filed a § 1983 suit claiming that their federal constitutional 
rights had been violated in the execution of a search warrant and 
three grand jury subpoenas.131 The claim sought injunctive relief as 
well as damages.132 By the time the case made it to the Supreme 
Court, the claims for injunctive relief had become moot.133 After dis-
missing the issue regarding the equitable claims on mootness 
grounds, the Court determined that the issue of abstention on the 
civil claim for damages was irrelevant because both parties had 
agreed to seek a stay of the damages claim after the remand.134 In 
light of this fact, the majority refused to rule definitively on the ap-
plication of Younger to federal cases that seek solely monetary re-
lief.135 However, Justices White and O’Connor filed an extensive con-
curring opinion which argued that the Court should readily apply 
Younger abstention to permit a stay of civil claims for monetary re-
lief.136 Indeed, Justice White stated that a plurality of circuits now 
apply the Younger doctrine to damages claims like the one at issue in 
Deakins.137 Therefore, Deakins made it clear that the Court was sim-
ply waiting for an opportune time to formally announce its decision 
to apply Younger abstention to civil claims for damages. 
 In Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co., the Court finally ad-
dressed the application of abstention to federal suits seeking solely 
monetary relief.138 The Court clearly held that in cases seeking relief 
                                                                                                                      
 128. Id. at 113-14. 
 129. Id. 
 130. 484 U.S. 193 (1988). 
 131. Id. at 196-97. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 199. 
 134. Id. at 202. 
 135. Id. at 202 n.6. 
 136. Id. at 209-10 (White, J., concurring). 
 137. Id. at 208 (citing Mann v. Jett, 781 F.2d 1448, 1449 (9th Cir. 1986); Doby v. 
Strength, 758 F.2d 1405, 1406 (11th Cir. 1985); Parkhurst v. State, 641 F.2d 775, 777 (10th 
Cir. 1981); Landrigan v. Warwick, 628 F.2d 736, 743 (1st Cir. 1980); McCurry v. Allen, 606 
F.2d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 1979)). Contra Thomas v. Tex. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 807 F.2d 
453, 457 (5th Cir. 1987); Carras v. Williams, 807 F.2d 1286, 1291-92 (6th Cir. 1986). 
 138. 517 U.S. 706 (1996). The Quackenbush case involved the application of Burford 
abstention to claims for damages to determine that a federal district court may stay a 
claim for damages. While this case does not explicitly create precedent in the context of 
Younger abstention, the Court has increasingly refused to categorize abstention claims by 
stating that, “[t]he various types of abstention are not rigid pigeonholes into which federal 
courts must try to fit cases. Rather, they reflect a complex [set] of considerations designed 
to soften the tensions inherent in a system that contemplates parallel judicial processes.” 
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that is equitable or discretionary in nature, federal courts have the 
power to decline to exercise jurisdiction altogether by either dismiss-
ing the suit or remanding it to state court.139 However, while the 
Court has held that a federal court may stay an action for damages 
on abstention principles, it has never held that “those principles sup-
port the outright dismissal or remand of damages actions.”140 Accord-
ingly, the Court found that abstention applies to civil actions for 
damages, but its application to cases seeking solely monetary relief is 
limited to a stay of the action pending adjudication of the state law 
claims in the state court.141 
2. Operation of the Res Judicata Doctrine in Abstention Cases: Is 
There Really a Distinction Between Stays and Dismissals? 
 While the Court’s opinion in Quackenbush seems to put careful 
and important limitations on the abstention doctrines, the reality is 
that the distinction between a stay and a dismissal has no practical 
value to a litigant seeking to exercise his or her right to a federal fo-
rum. Going back to Justices White and O’Connor’s concurring opin-
ion in Deakins,142 Justice White made an important observation re-
garding the effect of res judicata principles on situations where there 
is concurrent jurisdiction.143 Justice White stated that it is impera-
                                                                                                                      
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 n.9 (1987). Moreover, numerous scholars have 
argued that the Court is moving towards a merger of the various abstention doctrines. 
Georgene M. Vairo, Making Younger Civil: The Consequences of Federal Court Deference to 
State Court Proceedings, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 173, 212 (1989) (arguing that the Supreme 
Court has come very close to merging its tests for the various abstention doctrines and that 
the similarities so outweigh the differences that one test for abstention should be adopted); 
Stephen Jon Moss, Comment, Pennzoil: A Merger of Federal Abstention, 13 OKLA. CITY U. 
L. REV. 607 (1988) (arguing that the Pennzoil case effectively merged the Pullman and 
Younger abstention doctrines). Consequently, the Court’s decision to stay claims for dam-
ages under Burford abstention is almost certainly an indication of the treatment that 
damages claims will receive in the context of Younger abstention.  
 In fact, the Court has already signaled its intent to use the stay as the appropriate action 
in damages claims that fall within Younger. In Deakins v. Monaghan, Justices White and 
O’Connor filed an extensive concurring opinion in which they argued that the Court should 
readily apply Younger abstention to permit a stay of civil claims for monetary relief. 484 
U.S. at 209-10 (White, J., concurring). The Court only declined to do so in that case be-
cause the damages claim had become moot. Therefore, the Court will almost certainly ap-
ply Younger to civil claims for damages to permit a stay, just as it did with Burford absten-
tion in Quackenbush. 
 Finally, Burford abstention is also an area of abstention where the Court’s decision to 
permit stays in civil claims for damages will substantially undermine the operation of the 
removal jurisdiction statute. See discussion infra Part IV, pp. 218-21. For an excellent dis-
cussion of the effects of the Quackenbush opinion on diversity jurisdiction in general, see 
Lewis Yelin, Note, Burford Abstention in Actions for Damages, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1871 
(1999). 
 139. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 718. 
 140. Id. at 721. 
 141. Id. 
 142. 484 U.S. at 205 (White, J., concurring). 
 143. Id. at 208 (White, J., concurring). 
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tive that the federal claim be stayed until the adjudication of the 
state law claim is complete because any determinations made by the 
district court while the state court proceeding was ongoing would be 
binding on the state court because of res judicata principles.144 How-
ever, the countervailing problem apparently escaped Justice White, 
as he clearly failed to consider the effect that res judicata principles 
would have on the ability of the district court to hear the claims that 
it has retained after the completion of the state court litigation.  
 As a function of this type of duplicative litigation, the district 
court will frequently be barred from hearing the stayed claim be-
cause of the doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion. In ad-
dition to issue preclusion, the preclusive effects of concurrent state 
court litigation may arise from the doctrine of res judicata claim pre-
clusion. In general, most scholars and courts generically refer to 
these combined doctrines as the res judicata doctrine.145 However, the 
preclusive effects of prior litigation are frequently analyzed under 
two distinct concepts of preclusion. Collateral estoppel or issue pre-
clusion bars the relitigation of a matter that has already been de-
cided.146 Res judicata claim preclusion bars the litigation of a claim 
that could have been brought in earlier litigation.147 “In order to bar a 
later suit under the doctrine of res judicata, an adjudication must in-
volve (1) the same ‘claim’ as the later suit, (2) have reached a final 
judgment on the merits, and (3) involve the same parties or their 
privies.”148 While there are various articulations of a standard for de-
termining what constitutes identical claims for res judicata purposes, 
the Ninth Circuit standard is instructive. The Ninth Circuit analyzes 
the similarity of claims using the following criteria:  
 (1) whether rights or interests established in the prior judgment 
would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the second ac-
tion; (2) whether substantially the same evidence is presented in 
the two actions; (3) whether the two suits involve infringement of 
the same right; and (4) whether the two suits arise out of the same 
transactional nucleus of facts.149 
In virtually all abstention cases, the claims in federal court will be 
virtually identical to the state claims under this kind of standard. 
Because abstention issues are usually limited to resolving the con-
flict inherent in concurrent jurisdiction, the parties, facts, and claims 
                                                                                                                      
 144. Id. 
 145. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, ch. 3, introductory cmt. (1982); 18 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4402 (1981). The doc-
trine is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2003). 
 146. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982). 
 147. See id. § 24. 
 148. Nordhorn v. Ladish Co., 9 F.3d 1402, 1404 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 149. Id. at 1405. 
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will be the same in federal court as they are in state court. Conse-
quently, federal claims that are stayed for abstention reasons, pend-
ing adjudication of claims under state law or claims for injunctive re-
lief in state court, will frequently be subject to the preclusive effects 
of the res judicata doctrine. 
 In fact, in the context of abstention, a proceeding that is stayed in 
federal court may be litigated anyway in the state court litigation, ef-
fectively barring the district court from revisiting the state determi-
nation. First, we know in the removal context that the state court 
plaintiff preferred the state court forum. Therefore, if the district 
court remands the state claims and stays the federal ones, the state 
court plaintiff will probably reassert the federal claims in state court 
after the remand. Second, the joinder rules that are in effect in some 
states require litigants to bring their state and federal claims at the 
same time.150 Moreover, as the Court has previously observed in its 
own abstention rulings, the state court judge is unlikely to refuse to 
hear the federal claims on the grounds that he or she is purportedly 
incompetent to adjudicate them fairly. Consequently, a litigant’s fed-
eral claims may be heard as part of the underlying state proceeding 
and the federal district court will be prohibited from revisiting those 
determinations by virtue of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, known 
as issue preclusion.151 In addition to issue preclusion, res judicata 
claim preclusion acts to bar the litigation of any claim that could 
have been litigated in earlier litigation.152 Therefore, if a litigant fails 
to raise the stayed claim in state court, he or she will still be barred 
from litigating that claim in federal court because of the doctrine of 
res judicata.153 
 Multiple claims in the abstention context usually involve state 
and federal claims that arise from the same nucleus of facts or two 
claims that merely request different kinds of relief. Therefore, even if 
the state court litigant refuses to raise the federal claim or the dam-
ages claim at the state court level, all the factual and legal determi-
nations regarding the common nucleus of facts will be binding on the 
                                                                                                                      
 150. See Cogdell v. Hosp. Ctr. at Orange, 560 A.2d 1169 (N.J. 1989). Moreover, while 
most states do not require mandatory joinder, they still emphasize the fact that res judi-
cata claim preclusion will bar a claim that is not brought, effectively creating a mandatory 
joinder rule. See, e.g., Parsons Mobile Prods., Inc. v. Remmert, 531 P.2d 435 (Kan. 1975) 
(refusing to interpret joinder rule as mandatory, but noting that doctrine of res judicata 
requires that all grounds or theories for a cause of action be asserted or else barred in all 
future litigation); Sommers Estates Co. v. City of New Berlin, 554 N.W.2d 683 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1996) (holding that while joinder of claims is not mandatory, doctrine of res judicata 
claim preclusion bars later assertion of claims that could have been litigated in the original 
litigation). 
 151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982). 
 152. Id. § 24. 
 153. Id. 
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district court’s hearings by virtue of claim preclusion.154 Because 
multiple claims in the abstention context are usually indistinguish-
able on a factual level, the state court judgment will almost always 
be outcome determinative with respect to any subsequent proceeding 
in federal court. Therefore, claim preclusion will effectively bar the 
defendant’s right to have the case heard in federal court by binding 
the district court to all the state court’s determinations on the same 
issues.155 It should also be noted that the state court plaintiff in ab-
stention cases preferred the state forum. Consequently, if the district 
court stays some of the claims in federal court, the state court plain-
tiff can usually amend the pleadings in state court to reassert the 
federal claim in state court and the case would proceed to a judgment 
on the federal claim and bind the district court to the determination. 
In lieu of all that, issue preclusion may also bar the stayed claim 
from being heard at all.156 Therefore, in the vast majority of cases, 
the act of staying a claim for abstention reasons is functionally no 
different than a dismissal or remand because of the doctrines of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel.157 
3. The Quackenbush Opinion: Observations on the Effect of the 
Res Judicata Doctrine on Claims That Have Been Stayed  
on Abstention Grounds 
 It is relevant to engage in a review of the remarkable contradic-
tion in the Quackenbush opinion. Before reaching the issue of absten-
tion, the Court had to determine if a stay order could be immediately 
reviewed.158 The Court noted that the general rule is that “a party is 
entitled to a single appeal, to be deferred until final judgment has 
been entered, in which claims of district court error at any stage of 
the litigation may be ventilated.”159 Consequently, a party normally 
cannot appeal an order of the district court unless it is a final or-
der.160 However, the Court has recognized a narrow class of collateral 
orders that do not meet the requirements for finality, but are imme-
diately appealable “because they conclusively determine a disputed 
question that is completely separate from the merits [and is] effec-
tively unreviewable on [an] appeal from a final judgment.”161 In ap-
plying this standard to the facts in Quackenbush, the Court deter-
                                                                                                                      
 154. Id. § 27. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. For a good discussion of the claim preclusive effects of these doctrines in the Bur-
ford abstention context, see Yelin, supra note 138, at 1900-05. 
 158. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 712 (1996). 
 159. Id. (quoting Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994)). 
 160. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000). 
 161. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 712 (citations and quotations omitted). 
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mined that an abstention-based stay order readily met all these cri-
teria.162 Particularly, the Supreme Court stated:  
[s]uch orders could not be reviewed on appeal from a final judg-
ment in the federal action because the district court would be 
bound, as a matter of res judicata, to honor the state court’s judg-
ment; and that unlike other stay orders, which might readily be 
reconsidered by the district court, abstention-based stay orders of 
this ilk are “conclusive” because they are the practical equivalent 
of an order dismissing the case.163 
 While the order at issue in Quackenbush was a remand order, the 
Court determined that the remand order was, in all relevant re-
spects, indistinguishable from the abstention-based stay order that 
the Court found to be appealable in prior cases.164 Therefore, the 
Court concluded that it had jurisdiction to hear an immediate appeal 
of the remand order.165  
 After determining that an abstention-based stay order or remand 
order would be immediately appealable, the Court applied the ab-
stention doctrine to determine if the remand order was appropri-
ate.166 However, as noted above, the Court found that in the context 
of civil claims for damages, the abstention doctrines have only sup-
ported a stay of the federal action and not an outright dismissal or 
remand of the case to state court.167 Therefore, the Court found that 
the appropriate action under the abstention doctrine would have 
been to issue a stay.168 This conclusion is hard to believe when, a 
mere several paragraphs prior, the Court had determined that the 
operation of the res judicata doctrine would cause a stay order to 
function as the “practical equivalent of an order dismissing the 
case.”169 Therefore, the Court’s decision to only allow stay orders and 
not the outright dismissal or remand of cases in civil actions for 
damages does not create a limitation on the Younger abstention doc-
trine that has much practical value.  
4. The Exception to Claim Preclusion in Pullman Abstention: Is 
There an Exception in the Context of Younger Abstention? 
 There is also a question regarding the applicability of res judicata 
or collateral estoppel to claims that have been specifically reserved 
                                                                                                                      
 162. Id. at 713-14. 
 163. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 
460 U.S. 1, 12 (1983)). 
 164. Id. at 714. 
 165. Id. at 715. 
 166. Id. at 716. 
 167. Id. at 721.   
 168. Id. at 719. 
 169. Id. at 713 (emphasis added). 
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by the federal court through a stay that was issued pending the out-
come of a state court proceeding. In England v. Louisiana State 
Board of Medical Examiners,170 the Supreme Court held that after a 
federal court decision to abstain on Pullman abstention grounds, the 
litigant could refuse to bring his or her federal claims in a state court 
proceeding and reserve them for later adjudication in federal court.171 
In other words, the failure to bring a claim in state court would not 
have a preclusive effect on subsequent litigation in federal court. 
While the Supreme Court has not addressed the application of Eng-
land to other types of abstention claims, the Second Circuit clearly 
held in Temple of the Lost Sheep, Inc. v. Abrams172 that the England 
case does not apply outside the Pullman abstention context.173 In-
deed, England held that by deferring to state courts on Pullman ab-
stention grounds, a federal court may not relieve itself of the jurisdic-
tional duty it faced in the first place.174 However, the Abrams court 
stated that Younger abstention gives rise to an entirely different set 
of considerations because it involves two pending proceedings and 
conflicting jurisdictional duties.175 The situation is not one of merely 
postponing federal jurisdiction as in Pullman, but rather it is one 
that contemplates the outright dismissal of the federal suit and pres-
entation of both the federal and state claims in the state tribunal.176 
While Abrams involved a stay order and not a dismissal, the court 
clearly held that a stay order does not prevent the preclusive effects 
of the res judicata doctrine.177 A stay order issued in the Younger ab-
stention context fully anticipates that the state court will likely de-
termine virtually every issue of fact and law that is relevant to the 
federal claim.178 Moreover, those determinations will have a preclu-
sive effect on any subsequent proceeding in federal court.179 There-
fore, as the Supreme Court noted in Quackenbush, an abstention-
                                                                                                                      
 170. 375 U.S. 411 (1964). 
 171. Id. at 421-22. 
 172. 930 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 173. Id. at 182-83.  
 174. See 375 U.S. at 432 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 175. 930 F.2d at 182; see also HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FED-
ERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM ch. 7, § 3, at 1043 (2d ed. 1973) (stating that 
Younger abstention involves totally different considerations than the ones the England 
Court relied on to create an exception to the res judicata doctrine for Pullman abstention). 
 176. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 175, at 1043; see also Yelin, supra note 138, at 
1900-05 (questioning the application of the England case outside the Pullman abstention 
context and arguing that an exception to the claim preclusive effects of prior litigation in 
the Burford abstention context would undermine the federalism rationale for abstention). 
 177. See 930 F.2d at 184; see also Aquatherm Indus., Inc. v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 84 
F.3d 1388 (11th Cir. 1996) (applying the preclusive effects of the res judicata doctrine to a 
case that had been stayed in federal district court). 
 178. See Abrams, 930 F.2d at 183-84. 
 179. Id. 
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based stay order is functionally indistinguishable from an order dis-
missing the case.180 
 In sum, the Supreme Court has removed virtually all of the re-
maining restrictions on the Younger abstention doctrine. Specifically, 
the final frontier of Younger abstention is defined by the Court’s ab-
dication of the state interest test and the application of Younger ab-
stention to civil claims for damages. Accordingly, the doctrine applies 
to virtually all pending litigation in state court, even pending litiga-
tion that is civil in nature and seeks exclusively monetary relief. Be-
cause the state interest limitation was effectively abandoned as well, 
the final frontier of Younger abstention is a reality.  
IV.   IMPACT OF THE FULLY-EXPANDED DOCTRINE 
A.   Reviewing the Foundation for Applying Younger to Removal 
Jurisdiction 
 The Younger abstention doctrine has dramatically undermined 
the normal operation of the federal removal jurisdiction statute. It is 
important to review the determinations made above that are critical 
to the validity of this finding. In the beginning, the Younger doctrine 
had no effect on removal jurisdiction because it was a doctrine lim-
ited to the criminal law context.181 With the decision in Juidice v. 
Vail,182 the Court unequivocally established the doctrine’s application 
to civil proceedings.183 The doctrine also had several exceptions aris-
ing from its equitable roots that would potentially limit its impact on 
federal removal jurisdiction.184 However, as discussed above, the in-
herent scope of these exceptions was very limited, and the Court fur-
ther limited their practical application to the point of nullifying their 
ability to function as exceptions to the doctrine.185 
 As the doctrine evolved, a new factor arose as the principal limita-
tion on the scope of the doctrine. After rejecting the equitable founda-
tions of the doctrine in favor of Our Federalism,186 the Court used the 
state interest test instead of the equitable exceptions as the principle 
limitation on the doctrine.187 However, the decision in Pennzoil188 
demonstrates the illusory nature of the state interest test and makes 
it clear that virtually anything can be used as a means of justifying 
                                                                                                                      
 180. 517 U.S. 702, 713 (1996). 
 181. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
 182. 430 U.S. 327 (1977). 
 183. Id. at 334. 
 184. See Stagner, supra note 29. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975). 
 187. Id. 
 188. 481 U.S. 1 (1987). 
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abstention.189 Of course, there is no question that a claim that relies 
upon a state statute would be sufficient to apply Younger. However, 
even a state’s interest in developing its common law would be more 
substantial than the state interest involved in Pennzoil. Conse-
quently, seemingly any claim brought in state court that would in 
some way relate to the state’s common law in areas such as property, 
torts, contracts, or others would justify abstention. Here, one can 
only begin to imagine the sheer number of cases that would meet this 
criteria and merit abstention. Nevertheless, we should not get ahead 
of ourselves. 
B.   The Ongoing State Proceeding Requirement 
 There are several reasons why Younger abstention has not re-
ceived great attention in the context of removal jurisdiction. The 
principal reason for this is the ongoing state proceeding require-
ment.190 A plurality of lower courts have adopted a three-prong pre-
liminary test to determine whether Younger abstention applies in a 
given case.191 The test states that Younger abstention is only appro-
priate in cases in which (1) there is an ongoing state judicial proceed-
ing, (2) the proceeding implicates important state interests, and (3) 
there is an adequate opportunity to present the federal claims in the 
state proceeding.192 The state interest test in the second prong is still 
applied, but the discussion in Part III demonstrates the illusory na-
ture of this requirement. The third prong represents one of the sur-
viving exceptions to Younger, but the discussion in Part II demon-
strates that its application has been substantially mitigated by the 
Court. However, the first prong is an issue that remains unclear in 
                                                                                                                      
 189. See id.; see also Althouse, supra note 115. 
 190. The Supreme Court has never actually held that there must be an ongoing state 
proceeding for Younger abstention to apply. Indeed, the Younger Court specifically re-
served the question for a later time. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971); see also su-
pra text accompanying note 61. Moreover, in Hicks v. Miranda, Justice White stated that 
no other “case in this Court has held that for Younger v. Harris to apply, the state criminal 
proceeding must be pending on the day the federal case is filed.” 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975). 
Consequently, while most Younger cases arise in the context of an ongoing state proceed-
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requirement for the doctrine’s application. 
 191. Lower courts in a number of circuits have adopted a three-prong test that is ex-
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255 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 2001); J.B. ex rel. Hart v. Valdez, 186 F.3d 1280 (10th Cir. 1999); 
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Supreme Court, 80 F.3d 633 (1st Cir. 1996); Employers Res. Mgmt. Co. v. Shannon, 65 
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Servs., 1999 WL 813863 (D.N.H. 1999); Kim-Stan, Inc. v. Dep’t of Waste Mgmt., 732 F. 
Supp. 646 (E.D. Va. 1990); City of Chesapeake v. Sutton Enter., Inc., 138 F.R.D. 468 (E.D. 
Va. 1990); Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 689 F. Supp. 106 (N.D.N.Y. 1988). 
 192. See cases cited supra note 191.   
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the context of removal jurisdiction. Some scholars and lower courts 
have articulated the position that removal of the state proceeding to 
federal court eliminates the problem of duplicative litigation and 
prevents the operation of the Younger doctrine because of the lack of 
an ongoing state proceeding.193 The Supreme Court has not explicitly 
stated whether Younger applies in situations where all the matters of 
state concern have been removed to the federal court. However, there 
is substantial reason to believe that the practical effects of removal 
will not defeat the application of Younger abstention. 
 In the absence of guidance from the Supreme Court, there is no 
clear indication that Younger does not apply to cases that have been 
removed.194 Indeed, both the Fourth Circuit and the Sixth Circuit 
have readily applied Younger to cases that were removed.195 Techni-
cally speaking, the act of removal halts the concurrent proceeding in 
state court.196 However, as the district court stated in City of Chesa-
peake v. Sutton Enterprises, Inc., this argument exalts form over sub-
stance.197 The state court proceeding is no longer ongoing only be-
cause of its removal.198 Indeed, but for the defendant’s removal, there 
would still be a state claim in need of deference.199 Moreover, the on-
going proceeding requirement is readily satisfied because a state pro-
ceeding is by definition ongoing when a notice for removal is filed. 
Furthermore, the Court has held that the ongoing state proceeding 
requirement is satisfied anytime that state proceedings are initiated 
“before any proceeding of substance on the merits have taken place 
in the federal court.”200 Again, by definition, any case that is removed 
                                                                                                                      
 193. One commentator has argued that the act of removing a case to federal court de-
feats the application of Younger abstention because there is no longer an ongoing state 
proceeding. Barry Friedman, A Revisionist Theory of Abstention, 88 MICH. L. REV. 530 
(1989). In addition, a couple of circuit courts have held that the act of removal defeats the 
ongoing state proceeding requirement in the context of Colorado River abstention. See In re 
Burns & Wilcox, Ltd., 54 F.3d 475, 477-78 (8th Cir. 1995); Noonan South, Inc. v. County of 
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 195. Employers Res. Mgmt., 65 F.3d at 1134-35; Lutz, 1999 WL 1045163, at *1 (unpub-
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 196. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) (2003). 
 197. 138 F.R.D. 468, 474 (E.D. Va. 1990). 
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 200. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975); see also Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 
U.S. 922 (1975) (holding that an indictment that began in state court the day after the fed-
eral court action was filed should still be given deference under the doctrine of Younger ab-
stention). 
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from state court to federal court will have been initiated in state 
court prior to a hearing on the merits in federal court. Consequently, 
a proceeding is considered to be ongoing in state court for abstention 
purposes regardless of its removal to federal court.  
 While many courts have required that there be an ongoing state 
proceeding as a prerequisite for the application of Younger absten-
tion, the Supreme Court’s rulings have made it clear that the issue of 
ongoing state proceedings is a loose standard, if in fact it exists at all. 
As noted in Part II, the Court has already applied Younger absten-
tion to a case in which there was no ongoing state proceeding.201 In-
deed, in Hicks v. Miranda, Justice White clearly stated that no other 
“case in this Court has held that for Younger v. Harris to apply, the 
state criminal proceedings must be pending on the day the federal 
case is filed.”202 As long as a state court action begins prior to any 
“proceedings of substance on the merits,” Younger abstention will be 
readily applied.203 The Court affirmed this rejection of a strict ongo-
ing state proceeding requirement in Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.204 
Therefore, there is substantial reason to believe that the ongoing 
state proceeding requirement is not actually a requirement at all for 
Younger abstention.205 However, to the extent that it is still a consid-
eration, it is certainly clear that it is not a rigid standard that will be 
analyzed in a formulaic way. Because removal frustrates a legitimate 
state forum, the need for abstention seems clear under the Court’s 
decisions. 
 It should also be noted that other abstention doctrines are applied 
regardless of the presence of a pending state proceeding.206 Under 
Burford abstention, a federal court abstains from hearing any case 
where there are “difficult questions of state law bearing on policy 
problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends 
the result in the case then at bar,” or when the “exercise of federal 
review of the question in a case and in similar cases would be disrup-
tive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a 
matter of substantial public concern.”207 The Court has never re-
quired that there be an ongoing state proceeding as a prerequisite for 
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the application of Burford abstention.208 This is important for two 
reasons. First, there are a number of cases that can be removed on 
diversity grounds that fall squarely within Burford and would merit 
abstention even if there was no concurrent state proceeding involved. 
Second, the Court has increasingly refused to categorize abstention 
claims by stating that, “[t]he various types of abstention are not rigid 
pigeonholes into which federal courts must try to fit cases. Rather, 
they reflect a complex set of considerations designed to soften the 
tensions inherent in a system that contemplates parallel judicial 
processes.”209 Indeed, as some scholars have commented, the Court is 
slowly moving toward a merger of all the various abstention doc-
trines.210 The result could well be the elimination of the pending state 
proceeding requirement. In the beginning, the Court emphasized ab-
stention in the context of parallel proceedings because the requested 
remedy usually called for an injunction of the state proceeding.211 
However, as the Court has abandoned the equitable justifications for 
the doctrine, it has articulated a desire to avoid friction with the 
state on any level, not just friction in the realm of equity.212 There-
fore, any case that impacts a state prerogative is likely to merit ab-
stention, regardless of the presence of a contemporaneous proceeding 
in state court. 
 Despite any future developments that may occur in the realm of 
abstention, the fact remains that the ongoing state proceeding re-
quirement is still considered by the courts. Nevertheless, the count-
less expansions of this doctrine demonstrate that this circuitous and 
technical argument will almost certainly fail to win the hearts of a 
Court that has consistently reduced the rights of state court litigants 
to seek a federal forum. Consequently, Younger abstention almost 
certainly applies to cases in the removal jurisdiction context. 
C.   Removal Jurisdiction on Federal Question Grounds 
 Younger abstention will not apply to every case that is removed on 
federal question grounds. To remove a case on federal question 
grounds, the claim in the state proceeding must arise under the laws 
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or Constitution of the United States.213 A federal defense or counter-
claim is an insufficient basis for removing a case to federal court on 
federal question grounds.214 However, a case will not merit absten-
tion unless there is some discernible state interest or state law impli-
cated by the proceeding.215 While the state interest test has been sub-
stantially mitigated,216 there has to at least be a superficial state in-
terest to trigger abstention. If a claim is predicated solely on federal 
law, there will be limited circumstances in which a state interest will 
be implicated. However, if the claim relies on both federal law and 
state law or if a federal claim also has a supplementary state law 
claim, the entire claim can be removed to federal court. The result in 
that case would depend upon the kind of relief that was being sought 
in the federal court. Indeed, there remains a distinction between 
cases seeking injunctive or discretionary relief and cases seeking 
solely monetary relief.217 
 Early on, the Younger doctrine was used in situations where the 
federal court was being asked to enjoin a state proceeding.218 To this 
day, a claim seeking injunctive relief that merits abstention will be 
dismissed or remanded by the district court.219 Admittedly, the doc-
trine was expanded to claims seeking declaratory relief early in its 
development.220 However, prior to Quackenbush, the question of 
whether Younger applied to claims seeking solely monetary relief 
had not yet been fully analyzed.221 As mentioned earlier, the Court 
first applied Younger abstention to a claim seeking monetary relief in 
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Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n v. McNary.222 In that case, the 
Court determined that the claim for monetary relief required a de-
termination that the statute was unconstitutional, and therefore, it 
operated much like a request for injunctive relief.223 However, the 
great majority of pecuniary claims do not require the district court to 
strike down a state statute. Therefore, the potential application of 
Younger to all the other types of monetary claims is an important is-
sue.  
 As mentioned in Part III, the Court has applied Younger to claims 
that seek solely monetary relief, but only to the extent that the fed-
eral claim can be stayed until adjudication of the state claim has 
been completed.224 The Court has never authorized the outright dis-
missal or remand of federal claims seeking solely monetary relief.225 
However, this apparent limitation on the application of Younger to 
claims for damages is more illusory than real. Again, the doctrine of 
res judicata or collateral estoppel will cause the stay to operate as 
the practical equivalent of an order to remand or dismiss the case.226 
Therefore, a state court litigant that is removed to federal court can 
seek a stay of the federal claim on Younger abstention grounds and 
can effectively eviscerate the other party’s right to a federal forum. 
 In sum, when a case is removed to the district court on federal 
question grounds, Younger abstention will be applied if the movant 
can satisfy the state interest test. Once the court determines that ab-
stention is appropriate, the action it takes will depend on the type of 
relief that is being requested. If the requested relief is injunctive or 
discretionary in nature, the case will be dismissed or remanded to 
the state court.227 However, if the claim only seeks money damages, 
the court will stay the federal claims pending resolution of the state 
claims in the state court.228 Nevertheless, the existence of the preclu-
sive effects of res judicata and collateral estoppel principles will 
cause the stay to operate as a bar of the litigant’s right to have the 
federal claims heard in federal court.229 Consequently, any litigant 
whose case is removed to district court on federal question grounds 
can defeat the removal by asserting Younger abstention, as long as 
he or she can satisfy the state interest test. Again, the stay versus 
dismissal distinction is irrelevant. By permitting a stay of civil 
claims for damages, the Court has effectively applied Younger ab-
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stention to all civil claims and eviscerated the right to a federal fo-
rum under the removal jurisdiction statute. 
D.   Removal Jurisdiction in Diversity Cases 
 The role of abstention in cases that are removed on diversity 
grounds is far more pronounced. First, cases that are removed solely 
on diversity grounds typically do not satisfy the standards for re-
moval on federal question grounds. Therefore, claims that are re-
moved solely on diversity grounds always implicate state law. Conse-
quently, virtually any diversity case will satisfy the illusory state in-
terest requirement. Since the state interest test is not a factor, the 
action taken for abstention reasons will again depend on the type of 
relief being requested. However, because of the semantic distinction 
between stays and dismissals, any decision to abstain will result in 
an abdication of a party’s right to a federal forum. 
 A diversity case that seeks injunctive or declaratory relief will al-
most certainly result in a dismissal or remand of the case.230 The ap-
plication of Younger abstention to these types of cases is well estab-
lished, and the remedy has invariably been dismissal or remand.231 
This alone is sufficient to demonstrate the enormous impact that ab-
stention doctrines have on removal jurisdiction. Any number of de-
claratory actions that turn on issues of contract law, property law, 
tort law, or any state statute will merit abstention, regardless of di-
versity of citizenship. Moreover, a diverse party that seeks to enjoin 
the operation of a state law or ordinance will be unable to seek re-
dress in the unbiased federal courts.232 The impact of this type of ab-
stention alone is enormous. However, the abstention doctrine’s prac-
tical evisceration of removal jurisdiction does not end there.  
 Again, cases that seek solely monetary relief have only been found 
to warrant a stay of the claim and not an outright dismissal or re-
mand of the case.233 If a case that was removed on diversity grounds 
sought both injunctive and monetary relief, the damages claim would 
be stayed and the claim for injunctive relief would be remanded to 
state court.234 However, the litigants in state court will be required to 
bring their damages claim in state court or else the doctrine of res 
judicata claim preclusion will bar their right to have the district 
court hear it.235 If the litigant does bring the damages claim in state 
court, the district court will be barred from rehearing the claim by 
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virtue of collateral estoppel.236 Accordingly, the preclusive effects of 
the state court litigation will frequently bar the litigant’s right to 
have the district court revisit the damages claim after the conclusion 
of the state proceeding.  
 Again, the vast majority of diversity removal cases will warrant 
abstention. However, the abstention that is used in this context will 
frequently be Burford abstention and not Younger abstention. 
Younger abstention involves deference to ongoing state proceed-
ings.237 In the removal context, Younger is applied when a federal 
claim improperly removes a case from the state court that should 
have remained in the state court because of the state interest in-
volved.238 However, in the context of damages claims, the only action 
that is taken is a stay of federal or unique damages claims pending 
resolution of the other claims in the state court.239 In diversity cases 
that do not invoke federal question jurisdiction, there are no multiple 
claims that can be split between the federal court and the state court. 
Because remand or dismissal is improper in cases seeking only dam-
ages,240 there is no action that the district court can take on Younger 
abstention grounds. However, Burford abstention is not based on a 
need to defer to a concurrent state court proceeding.241 Rather, Bur-
ford counsels that a district court should abstain from hearing a case 
if the case involves a difficult question of state law or if it implicates 
a state regulatory scheme,242 regardless of the presence of an ongoing 
state proceeding.243 Admittedly, the court still cannot remand or dis-
miss a claim for damages on Burford abstention grounds.244 However, 
the district court can stay the claim in federal court pending the reso-
lution of some question of state law.245 Because cases that are re-
moved solely on diversity grounds necessarily implicate state law, 
there are a vast number of cases where the federal claim will have to 
be stayed pending resolution of some issue of state law. If the unclear 
state law involves a question about a regulatory scheme or a vague 
area of the common law, the claim in federal court could languish 
almost indefinitely under a stay. 
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V.   A CRITIQUE OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ABSTENTION  
JURISPRUDENCE 
A.   The Conflict Between Abstention and the Duty to Exercise Federal 
Jurisdiction Where It Exists 
 Federal district courts have an imperative duty to exercise their 
jurisdiction when faced with the removal of diversity cases from state 
court. The judicial authority of federal courts to hear diversity cases 
arose from Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution246 and is codified 
pursuant to the Article III authority of Congress in 28 U.S.C. § 1332 
(2000). Congress alone has the authority to define and limit the ju-
risdiction of the federal courts of the United States.247 Pursuant to 
this obligation, Congress has endowed the district courts with the 
original jurisdiction to hear cases that are removed from state 
court.248 Among other things, the removal jurisdiction statute author-
izes the removal of any case to federal court that has diversity of citi-
zenship.249 Anyone that removes a case to federal court under this 
statute has properly invoked the Article III jurisdiction of the district 
court.  
 The various abstention doctrines all involve the refusal of a fed-
eral court to exercise jurisdiction where it exists.250 However, the Su-
preme Court has repeatedly held that federal courts have a virtually 
unflagging obligation to exercise the jurisdiction given them.251 In 
fact, this principle is so old and venerated that it can be traced to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Cohens v. Virginia all the way back in 
1821.252 The Cohens court stated that “[w]e have no more right to de-
cline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that 
which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the 
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[C]onstitution.”253 Consequently, the entire practice of abstention is 
one that on its face risks treason to the Constitution. It is this fact 
which forced the Supreme Court to recognize that “[t]he doctrine of 
abstention . . . is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty 
of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it.”254  
 While the early abstention cases were narrowly construed, there 
were indications of the tremendous expansions of the doctrine that 
would occur in later years. It is this fact which led to the extensive 
and vigorous dissent by Justice Brennan in Louisiana Power & Light 
Co. v. City of Thibodaux.255 In Thibodaux, the district court abstained 
from hearing a case that had been removed from state court on di-
versity grounds.256 The case involved the exercise of the City of 
Thibodaux’s eminent domain power for the purpose of expropriating 
property that belonged to the Power & Light Company.257 Because 
the statutory authority for the expropriation had never been inter-
preted by the Louisiana Supreme Court, the United States Supreme 
Court held that it was within the district judge’s discretion to stay 
the case on abstention grounds until the parties secured a declara-
tory judgment in the state courts.258 However, the absence of a state 
court opinion interpreting the relevant statute hardly reflected the 
type of narrow and extraordinary circumstances that traditionally 
brought a case within the scope of the abstention doctrine. 
 The obligation of federal courts to interpret state law is one that 
pervades a substantial number of cases in federal court. Since the 
Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomp-
kins, it has been beyond question that federal courts in diversity 
cases are to apply the law of the states.259 As a concomitant out-
growth of the Erie doctrine, federal courts are necessarily called upon 
to interpret the various laws of the states.260 In fact, virtually every 
case that is before a federal court by virtue of diversity jurisdiction 
calls for the interpretation of state law. It is this fact which under-
mines the Supreme Court’s decision in Thibodaux. As Justice Bren-
nan observed in his Thibodaux dissent, the majority’s decision to ab-
stain for the purpose of avoiding the interpretation of state law 
would open the door for abstention to virtually any case that invokes 
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the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts.261 Indeed, Brennan 
stated that the majority’s holding flatly ignored clear precedent from 
prior cases that limited the narrow area in which abstention was 
permissible and required jurisdiction to be exercised in all cases that 
did not satisfy the extraordinary criteria for abstention.262 Justice 
Brennan went on to say that the departure from prior limitations on 
abstention would allow district courts to refer cases of state law to 
state courts in even the routine negligence and contract actions.263   
 While Brennan’s dissent in Thibodaux demonstrated remarkable 
prescience, the case had a weak majority and it would not be until 
many years later that Justice Brennan’s parade of horribles would 
become a reality. In fact, the Court’s decision in Thibodaux predated 
even Younger v. Harris. However, it was not the mere development of 
Younger abstention that would consummate Brennan’s worst fears. 
After all, the original Younger opinions were confined to cases that 
sought an injunction against a state court criminal proceeding. 
Strictly speaking, this application of the abstention doctrine did not 
do violence to the narrow construction of the doctrine.  
B.   Younger Abstention Today: Going Beyond Justifiable Limits 
 The case for abstention in claims that seek an injunction of state 
criminal proceedings is arguably consistent with one of the original 
extraordinary circumstances that justified the application of the doc-
trine. Among the other limited justifications for abstention, the Court 
sanctioned abstention on the ground of comity with the states—
discussed as the need to avoid decisions that create needless friction 
with state policies.264 To whatever extent this is a valid basis for ab-
stention, one can easily see how an injunction of a state court crimi-
nal proceeding would create extensive and unnecessary friction with 
state prerogatives. The problem lies in the dramatic expansions of 
the Younger abstention doctrine, particularly its application to civil 
claims for damages between purely private parties. Because of the 
extensive expansions of the Younger abstention doctrine discussed in 
this Comment, virtually any case that is removed to federal court can 
be refused under Younger. With the doctrine of abstention virtually 
eviscerating the removal jurisdiction statute, it seems clear that the 
Court has abandoned the narrow and extraordinary construction of 
the doctrine that was required in light of the federal courts’ virtually 
unflagging obligation to exercise jurisdiction where it exists. 
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 It is entirely uncertain from the Court’s extensive abstention ju-
risprudence why the interests of comity are constitutionally suffi-
cient to repudiate the jurisdiction which Congress has placed upon 
them through the exercise of its Article III powers.265 This is particu-
larly true in light of the Court’s numerous observations regarding the 
duty of federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction that Congress has 
given to them.266 While some commentators have rejected the notion 
that federal courts have an absolute duty to exercise their jurisdic-
tion,267 even the Court’s own abstention cases make it clear that a re-
fusal to exercise jurisdiction should not be undertaken lightly.268 
While some extraordinary cases may require a district court to refuse 
the exercise of its jurisdiction, it seems almost axiomatic that such 
refusals must not rise to the level of repudiating an entire area of ju-
risdiction that was created by a clear and unequivocal act of Con-
gress. While many scholars have expressed great disdain for diver-
sity jurisdiction, federal courts must not be allowed to unilaterally 
act to eliminate that entire area of jurisdiction for the purpose of 
clearing their dockets. However, this is precisely what the modern 
developments in the Younger abstention doctrine have done. By es-
sentially eliminating the right of a party to remove a case to federal 
court on diversity grounds, and to a lesser extent on federal question 
grounds, the Court has substantially interfered with the Article III 
prerogatives of Congress. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 The final frontier of Younger abstention is defined by the virtual 
abdication of all the limitations that purportedly restrain the use of 
the abstention doctrine in federal courts. Having undergone a long 
series of unprecedented expansions, the Younger abstention doctrine 
stands to defy the operation of the removal jurisdiction statute in the 
vast majority of civil cases. While some commentators, lower courts, 
and practitioners have refused to believe that Younger abstention 
applies in the context of removal, they should be reminded of the $11 
billion lesson that Texaco endured at the hands of the Supreme 
Court. Every aspect of the Court’s development of the doctrine indi-
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cates that it will be readily applied in this context. Moreover, the 
Court has demonstrated that abstention in general is about far more 
than merely showing deference to concurrent state proceedings. Ab-
stention is a doctrine designed to prevent any intrusion whatsoever 
by federal courts on the sovereignty of the states. Such a doctrine 
will not yield to the mere technical requirement of an ongoing state 
proceeding. 
 For many, the application of Younger abstention in the removal 
context is hard to swallow because of what it represents. Such ab-
stention represents a sweeping judicial abdication of congressionally 
mandated jurisdiction. It is difficult to justify the enormous scope of 
the modern abstention doctrines in light of the paramount duty of 
federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction that Congress has given to 
them. Nevertheless, the virtual destruction of the congressionally 
created removal power is the precise reality that we are now faced 
with.  
 For anyone who believes that this is not possible, I would remind 
them of the tremendous effect that Younger abstention has already 
had on civil rights claims under § 1983. The very purpose of § 1983 
was to interpose the federal courts between people and the states to 
ensure the proper vindication of federal rights. A litigant that wishes 
to challenge an ongoing state proceeding has every right to bring a § 
1983 claim in federal court. Nevertheless, the Court has refused to 
exercise its congressionally mandated jurisdiction in this context as 
well. If the Court is willing to scrap § 1983 when abstention is war-
ranted, you can bet that it will do the same with the removal juris-
diction statute. Indeed, a number of lower courts have already ap-
plied Younger abstention to cases that have been removed. Today, we 
are merely waiting for confirmation from the Supreme Court. In the 
meantime, the application of Younger abstention in the removal con-
text represents a dangerous, questionable, and important develop-
ment in the world of everyday litigation. 
